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THE FUTURE OF THE EURO:
A PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE1
"The Maastricht Treaty ... has strengthened
the Bundesbank's determination to reduce
German inflation to very low levels"
(1993b).2
"A qualified majority of the Council will
decide that a qualified majority of the
member-countries is fit to enter the third
stage. This implies that European Monetary
Union will not begin with a hard core of
hard currencies" (1993b).3
"Any German government which, in early
1998, agreed to join the third stage of EMU
according to the currently envisaged time-
table, would be committing electoral
suicide ..." (1996).4
1. Introduction and overview
Public choice analysis can be helpful in predicting the course of European monetary
integration and policy. The median (or decisive) voter theorem, the theory of the political
business cycle and the economic theory of bureaucracy are all applicable. The purpose of this
paper is to explain and predict the behaviour of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the
Council of Ministers on the basis of the available empirical evidence.
Section 2 relies on the median voter theorem to derive predictions for the inflation rate
of the euro. It shows that inflation rates have to be explained by the voters' sensitivity to
inflation rather than the independence of central bankers and that the French members of the
ECB Council hold the median position in terms of past inflation, voters' sensitivity to inflation
and predicted or simulated preferred inflation. However, if the historical real exchange rate
change is extrapolated and if failure to agree on an Executive Board is considered a
possibility, the Belgian member of the ECB Council is the inflation median.
                                                
1 Computational assistance from Ingrid Eitel, Bernhard Reichert and, most of all, Christian Teubner is gratefully
acknowledged.
2 Vaubel (1993b, p. 108).
3 Vaubel (1993b, p. 111).
4 Vaubel (1996, p. 18). However, I have to admit that I have always, as in this case, regarded political suicide as
unlikely. It is an anomaly but it does occur.
2Section 3 shows that there is a high probability of  a political business cycle occurring
between May 2002 and June 2004, probably with a peak in May 2003 or December 2002.
Section 4 argues that the euro's long-run effect on employment is ambiguous and cannot
be predicted. However, European Monetary Union (EMU) is likely to have the largest
negative, or smallest positive, effect on employment in Finland, Spain and Italy.
Section 5 presents evidence on whether an exchange rate policy for the euro is needed. It
shows that, between the euro-zone and the U.S. dollar, nominal exchange rate trends are
increasingly in line with the required real exchange rate adjustments. In the more recent past,
exchange rate flexibility has outperformed the Bretton Woods system in this respect.
Section 6 considers the possibility of enlarging the European Monetary Union by the
current members of the European Union (EU) and by Eastern European countries. The
evidence presented indicates that, of all 15 EU members, Britain is the least suitable EMU
member in terms of real exchange rate adjustment and that British entry could induce the ECB
to raise the cost of reserve requirements. Since any qualified majority in the European Council
must include the country which holds the median position in the ECB Council, any
enlargement shifting the ECB median would require some form of compensation. If France
occupies the ECB median, it is not interested in admitting the U.K. Most of the Eastern
European countries are shown to require very large real exchange rate adjustments. For them,
the cost of joining EMU would be very large. Only Hungary has the predicted exchange rate
regime.
The last section derives the size and composition of EMU central bank staff from a
labour demand equation estimated for 21 industrial countries. It shows that the European
System of Central Banks (ESCB), notably the French, Belgian, and Italian central banks, are
highly overstaffed by international standards. Estimates of the required staff of the ESCB and
the ECB are derived from international comparisons.
2. Inflation
Monetary policy for the euro is determined by a simple majority of the Governing
Council of the European Central Bank. Thus, the inflation rate of the euro will reflect the
preference of the median ECB Council member  (unless logrolling plays an important role.)
3To determine the median, the (relative) inflation preferences of the various ECB Council
members have to be known.5
2.1. Quantitative analysis
The simplest and crudest method of predicting relative inflation preferences  is to
extrapolate past inflation rates. This method is justified if the following assumptions apply:
(i) Central bankers are appointed or proposed by the government of their home country
because they share the long-run inflation preference of that government.
(ii) The governments of the member states are elected because they share the long-run
inflation preference of the median voter of their country.
(iii) The long-run inflation rate preferred by the median voter in each country has not
changed.
Various stability tests (Collins, Giavazzi 1993; Hayo 1998a) show that, up to 1993, the third
assumption cannot be rejected for any of the participating countries.6 Even if inflation
preferences have changed since 1993, the following analysis might be indicative of the
relative positions of the national representatives. Alternatively, it could be interpreted not as a
prediction but as an illustrative simulation of what would have happened if EMU had been
introduced after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system.
Table 1 reports the national compound average inflation rates since 1976. 1976 is the
initial year because the Bretton Woods system finally collapsed in 1973 and because monetary
policy affects inflation with a lag of about two years. Since monetary expansion may have
been biased downwards by the need to meet the inflation criterion of the Maastricht Treaty
                                                
5 See also the median-voter simulation of de Grauwe, Dewachter and Aksoy (1999). They derive desired values
for the monetary instrument from hypothetical Keynesian loss functions, estimated trade-offs between the target
variables (output, inflation and instrument smoothing) and historical output shock structures (1979-94).  They
report that, if both output shocks and preferences differ among the participating countries and if each member of
the ECB Governing Council represents the interests of her home country, the transition to a common monetary
policy creates the largest discrepancies between the decided and the desired value of the monetary instrument for
Italy, Portugal, Ireland and Finland, i.e., the peripheral member states (Table 10).
6 In both studies, opinion poll data about the evaluation of economic or, more precisely, inflation performance are
regressed on inflation. There is not a single country for which all four tests indicate a significant structural break
(let alone, at the same moment in time). The results of Collins and Giavazzi for the period 1974-90 show that, at
conventional levels, the aversion to inflation increased significantly in the U.K. and Denmark but not in the EMU
countries (e.g., France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Ireland) and that it significantly decreased in
Germany  (in 1986). Hayo's three tests for 1976-93 (Table 2.14) show a significant increase of  the sensitivity to
inflation in the Netherlands and Luxembourg whose inflation rates are far below the ECB median anyway.
However, according to Hayo's recursive regressions, there seems to have been some (insignificant) increase of
the sensitivity to inflation in seven EMU countries - least of all in France.
4(December 1991)7, the base period used for prediction should probably not extend beyond
1993.
The first column indicates the current distribution of ECB votes. Each member of the
Executive Board is assumed to share and represent the inflation preferences of the government
which has proposed her. The two small countries which have representatives on the Executive
Board are unlikely to keep these seats but, as we shall see, this is unlikely to affect the median.
Table 1 shows that, regardless of whether the base period ends in 1993 or 1998, the
French inflation rate occupies the median position in the ECB Council. In 1976-93, it
amounted to 6.7 per cent per annum which is somewhat less than the ECB-weighted average
(7.0 per cent). The French ECB members also hold the median if, for the other participating
countries, the French inflation rate is adjusted by their historical real exchange rate change
vis-à-vis France. Eight representatives have experienced (preferred) a higher inflation rate,
and seven a lower inflation rate, than monetary union with a French median would have
implied. The highest national inflation rate would have been 7.8 per cent (in Spain and
Ireland), the lowest 5.5 per cent (in Finland).
The underlying assumption that the historical long-run inflation rates have actually
been preferred by the national electorates, might as well be tested. The voters' sensitivity to
inflation has been estimated by Hayo (1998a, b) for the twelve member states of 1993. It is
indicated by the regression coefficient with which the current inflation rate affects the rank of
price stability among four objectives.8 Table 2, column 1, reports the sensitivity to inflation
for nine of the eleven EMU countries. For Austria and Finland, survey data are not available
before 1995 - the year in which they joined the European Union. Among the nine countries,
once more, France holds the median position in the ECB Council. The same is true if, on the
basis of past inflation (Table 1), the French sensitivity to inflation is assumed to be higher
than the Finnish but lower than the Austrian.
Alternatively, the inflation aversion of monetary policy makers (the weight of the price
stability target in the loss function) has been estimated from policy reaction functions by Lippi
                                                
7 At least, this is the impression conveyed by fiscal policy in 1998. As the International Monetary Fund, the
European Commission and the European Central Bank have noted, fiscal consolidation in the euro-zone has
virtually come to an end despite the temporary economic upswing in 1998.
8 The other objectives are public order, democracy and freedom of speech. The survey results are regularly
reported by Eurobarometer (so-called Ingleheart index). The dependent variable is set at 1 if price stability is
ranked first or second. Otherwise it is zero. The regression has been run over the period 1976-93 for each country
except Greece (1980-93), Portugal and Spain (1985-93). I use Hayo's OLS estimates (β12 in Table 4 of Hayo,
1998b) because his RALS and SURE estimates show these coefficients to be robust.  In the unlikely event that
exogenous changes in the rank of price stability negatively affected the actual rate of inflation within the same
year (reverse causation), Hayo's regression coefficient would be biased downwards.
5and Swank (1999, Ch. 8, notably Table 8.2). Their estimates for 1965-92 (Table 2, column 2)
confirm the view that France occupies the median position in the ECB Council. The
correlation between Hayo's estimate of the voters' sensitivity to inflation and the inflation
aversion of policy makers as estimated by Lippi and Swank is positive and significant at the 1
per cent level (r=0.91, n=9).
To what extent does the voters' sensitivity to inflation explain the historical inflation
experience? Table 3 reports a cross-section regression of actual inflation  (1976-93) on Hayo's
estimate of the voters' sensitivity to inflation. The best fit is provided by a constant elasticity
specification. As expected, the regression coefficient is negative and significant at the 1 per
cent level. The national sensitivity to inflation explains 85 per cent of the cross-sectional
inflation variance. Table 2, column 3, reports the predicted inflation rates. Among nine
countries, the inflation rate predicted for France (5.8 per cent) is the median in the ECB
Council (without the Austrian and Finnish members). The same is true if, for Austria and
Finland, the actual inflation rates are inserted. Equation 1 can be used to infer the Austrian
and  Finnish sensitivity to inflation from their historical inflation rates (see Table 2, column 1,
in parentheses).
So far the analysis has assumed, for the sake of simplicity, that inflation depends only
on the voters' sensitivity to inflation or that all other influences are randomly distributed. It has
totally ignored the impressive body of evidence that inflation is also (negatively) affected by
central bank independence (I). However, central bank independence may merely reflect the
voters' sensitivity to inflation. Regressing central bank independence (an average of seven
indices9) on the sensitivity to inflation,10 we obtain the following estimate:
ln I =  -0.008  +  0.473 ln S R2 = 0.74
         (-0.08)      (5.06*) n  =  11
As expected, the two variables are closely correlated. The sensitivity to inflation retains
its significant regression coefficient (t=3.52*), if it is combined with a dummy for universal
banking, the interest group variable used by Posen (1993a, b).11 If the sensitivity to inflation is
not in turn affected by the independence of the central bank, we can use the above equation to
                                                
9 The average has been computed by Masciandaro and Spinelli (1993) from the indices of Banaian, Laney,
Willett (1983), Bade, Parkin (1985), Alesina, Summers (1990), Burdekin, Willett (1990), Grilli, Masciandaro,
Tabellini (1991), Cukierman (1991) and Eijffinger, Schaling (1992). To facilitate the calculation, this average of
indices has been rebased so that its value for Germany is equal to e. See Table 2, column 4.
10 Since the Irish Punt, before being linked to the D-Mark in 1979, was pegged to the Pound Sterling, the Irish
inflation rate has not been affected by the independence of the Bank of Ireland. In this sample and in equations 5-
10 (Table 3),  therefore, the Bank of Ireland is replaced by the Bank of England.
6explain and predict central bank independence (Table 2, column 5). It turns out that, in the
U.K. and Finland, the central bank is much more independent than we should expect from the
sensitivity to inflation and that, in Luxembourg and Spain, the opposite is the case.
While central bank independence can be explained by the sensitivity to inflation, the
latter seems to largely determined by the experience of hyperinflation in the past:
Si,t =   1.57   +   0.069 π i,t-n     R2 = 0.66
         (4.55*)     (4.22*)              n = 11
where πt-n is the (compound) annual average rate of inflation between 1900 and 1940
(Maddison 1991, Mitchell 1992).
Table 3 demonstrates that central bank independence has a less significant (negative)
effect on inflation than the sensitivity to inflation does (equations 1 and 2)12 and that, if both
are used as regressors, the coefficient of central bank independence is no longer significant
(equation 4).
However, the conventional approach of explaining inflation by central bank
independence is conceptually flawed anyway. Central bank independence can hardly affect the
long-term inflation rate if the government has fixed the exchange rate vis-à-vis a dominant
currency. Thus, to explain inflation in a European cross-section analysis, central bank
independence (or its unexplained component13) has to be weighted by the proportion of time
during which the currency was not pegged to the D-Mark (1-f). The proportion of time during
which the currency was pegged (f) is reported in Table 2, column 6.
Table 3, equation 5, shows that central bank independence under a regime of flexible
exchange rates does not have a significant effect on inflation if it is combined with the
sensitivity to inflation. The coefficient of the independence variable does not even take the
predicted sign.
However, equation 5 is still incomplete because it does not account for the effect of
exchange-rate pegging (f) itself. Pegging may be regarded as a proxy for the competitive or
disciplinary pressure from the Bundesbank which now has disappeared. Since the
independence of the Bundesbank is normalised to e, ln ef = f can be interpreted as the natural
                                                                                                                                                        
11 The dummy for universal banking takes a positive but insignificant coefficient. The same is true for Posens's
measure of political instability. Posen's results are also questioned by de Haan, van't Hag (1995).
12 Hayo (1998b, Table 7) obtains the same result by computing rank correlation coefficients. His Spearman rank
correlation coefficient is -0.91 for the sensitivity to inflation but only -.72 for the best-fitting index of central
bank independence. In line with the conventional approach, equations 2-4 in Table 3 explain Irish inflation by
Irish central bank independence.
13 In this context, simultaneous equation estimation might be considered but it is not required for our purpose,
which is forecasting.
7logarithm of the independence index of the Bundesbank exponentially weighted with the
proportion of time during which the country pegged to the D-Mark. Thus, apart from the
effect of the sensitivity to inflation, inflation is explained by a combination of central bank
independence at home and in Germany, with 1-f and f serving as exponential weights. Table
3, equation 6, reveals that neither central bank independence at home nor pegging to the D-
Mark has a significant effect on inflation if the sensitivity to inflation is included as a
regressor.14
Central bank independence and pegging also fail to explain inflation if, in addition, the
ratio of imports to GDP is included (equations 8-10). The theoretical justification for
including  this variable is that, with a higher import / GDP ratio, an unanticipated monetary
expansion or devaluation has a faster effect on the price level because a larger share of the
consumer basket is affected by the depreciation of the currency. As a result, voters are more
likely to understand the monetary  causes of inflation and object to an inflationary monetary
policy (H.G. Johnson 1970, p. 105; D. Romer 1993). Equations 8-10 in Table 3 reveal that the
import / GDP ratio does indeed reduce inflation significantly.15 The members of the ECB
Council are confronted with a less open currency area than the national central banks have
been. Insofar, they are likely to tolerate a higher rate of inflation.
It is now possible to simulate the long-term inflation rates which the various members of
the ECB Council would have preferred, if they had been as independent as the Bundesbank
and if their currency had not been pegged to a currency like the D-Mark. The preferred long-
term inflation rates are computed from equations 6 and 8, setting f=0 and ln I1-f  = ln e1 =1. As
columns 7 and 8 of Table 2 show, the French members keep their median position in the ECB
Council regardless of the equation used if monetary union is assumed to imply that the
participating states share a common inflation rate. If the historical real exchange rate change is
extrapolated,  the Spanish members of the ECB Council hold the median, and the simulated
inflation rates rise (Table 2, columns 9 and 10). However, the simulated Spanish inflation
rates (7.1 and 10.0 per cent, respectively) are still lower than the actual Spanish inflation rate
                                                
14 The insignificant effect of f is not due to significant collinearity with the sensitivity to inflation: r (f, ln S) =
0.30).
15 This result is also obtained by Campillo, Miron (1998) and Iversen (1999).
If we distinguish fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes as we have done in the case of central bank
independence, the import / GDP ratio can be shown to have a larger effect under flexible exchange rates but the
regression coefficients are merely significant at the 10 per cent level and R2 adj. is virtually unchanged.
Simulation with this equation would yield higher inflation rates than equations 6 or 8 do.
Some further control variables (the budget deficit / GDP ratio, the unemployment rate, union density ) have
been tried as suggested by Oatley (1999) but they did not have a significant effect on inflation or the regression
coefficients of the other explanatory variables.
8in this period. The weighted average of the preferred inflation rates falls if equation 6 is used,
and it rises if equation 8 is used. Thus, with regard to inflation preferences, the increase in
central bank independence outweighs the loss of disciplinary pressure from the Bundesbank16
but the fact that the import / GDP ratio is smaller for the EMU than for the individual
participating states shifts the balance towards higher preferred inflation.
2.2. Complications
In simulating the inflation rate of the euro, we have made a number of simplifying
assumptions which have to be discussed.
First of all, is the European Central Bank as independent as the Bundesbank has been?
On the one hand, the ECB is more independent because amendments of the EC Treaty require
the assent of 15 parliaments (each voting by simple majority) while the Bundesbank Law may
be amended by a single parliament (also with a simple majority). On the other hand, the
individual members of the ECB Governing Council enjoy less personal independence. The
members of the German Central Bank Council have always been reappointed (after eight
years) if they wished so and if their age permitted. This is not prescribed by the Bundesbank
Law but a tradition which has evolved over the years. By contrast, as Table 4 shows, eight of
the eleven national Governors in the ECB Council depend on their government for
reappointment (usually after five or six years). At least six of the current Governors are young
enough to be reappointable.17
The members of the Executive Board, it is true, may not be reappointed but they may
need career assistance from their government when their term is over and they return to their
home country. As Table 4 demonstrates, the French and Spanish members of the Executive
Board will not have reached the retirement age when their term of office ends.
Moreover, the European Central Bank would enjoy less policy autonomy than the
Bundesbank has, if the Council of Ministers adopted an exchange rate target for the euro. In
1979, the Bundesbank obtained permission to abandon interventions in the exchange market
whenever it might see a threat to price-level stability. It made use of this right in August 1993.
The ECB does not seem to be entitled to take such a decision.
                                                
16 This result was also reached by Vaubel (1994) in a different analysis.
17 These are the Governors from Belgium, Finland, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Portugal. The
Italian Governor is appointed "for life" (i.e., up to the retirement age). The Spanish Governor may not be
reappointed.
9Even if the overall independence of the ECB were considered comparable to the former
independence of the Bundesbank, the sources of central bank (in)dependence would have
changed. Graph 1 shows how this affects the objective function of central bankers. Central
bankers follow their own judgement, public opinion or the government (or a combination
thereof). Popularity serves to maintain the central bank's policy autonomy und secure
reappointment or career assistance. Autonomy is a means for attaining macroeconomic
targets, political aims or the utility of personal power and prestige.
Relative to the Bundesbank, the policy autonomy of the European Central Bank is less
threatened by amendments of its legal statute. Thus, it is less likely to seek the support of
public opinion - the more so as a European public opinion does not exist. The main threat to
the policy autonomy of the ECB is the possibility  of an exchange rate target vis-à-vis the
dollar. However, the introduction of a parity system requires a unanimous decision by the
Council of Ministers (Art. 111 (1)). This means that the European Central Bank can focus on
public opinion in one or a few participating countries which have a tradition of distrusting any
pegging to the dollar (Germany, the U.K. etc.). Thus, the threat to policy autonomy and the
cost of preserving it will be smaller for the European Central Bank than for the Bundesbank.
Since the members of the ECB Council enjoy more security of policy autonomy but less
security of tenure, government objectives will matter more, and public opinion less, in
European than in German monetary policy. To this extent, the individual members of the ECB
Council will pay more attention to the ideology of their government18 and to the election cycle
at home. Political business cycles are likely to raise the long run average rate of inflation.19
As for government ideology, seven of the eleven participating states have socialist-led
governments but no more than six of the seventeen members of the ECB Council may be
associated with socialist parties (Table 4). Among the governors, the reasons for this
discrepancy differ from country to country. But why are five of the six executive directors
conservatives even though the Executive Board had to be appointed unanimously?20 Have the
governments tried to offset a time inconsistency bias  by appointing conservative central
bankers as Rogoff (1985) has proposed?
                                                
18 Note that the prediction of the long-run rate of inflation has ignored ideological or partisan effects. This is
innocuous if  the partisan composition of governments in 1974-93 can be regarded as respresentative for the
future.
19 According to Posen (1998), this effect is positive but not statistically significant at conventional levels.
20 They are political conservatives, not necessarily monetary conservatives. Another interesting feature is the
assignment of functions to the individual members of the Executive Board. While the German government
claimed the Directorates for Economics and Research, the French member obtained control over Administration,
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There is an alternative explanation. If the European Council had been unable to agree on
the members of the Executive Board, there would have been no monetary union.21 The
government which had most to lose (or least to gain) from EMU had a strong bargaining
position. This was the German government, a conservative-liberal coalition government. It
had most to lose because the German central bank had played a leading role under the
previous regime, German inflation preferences are most deviant from the median (Table 2,
column 1), Germany would be the main loser of seigniorage (Table 4), monetary union was
rejected by an overwhelming majority of German voters, and a national election was
imminent.
Future German governments will not have a strong bargaining position when new
members of the Executive Board are selected. EMU will not break up if the Executive Board
is incomplete or has ceased to exist. If there is no Executive Board, a simple majority of the
national Governors will decide about monetary policy for the euro. With this fallback
position, the government which (most nearly) shares the preferences of the median Governor
will dominate the selection of new executive directors (if any). The other governments will
concur if they prefer to have an Executive Board for reputational reasons. If the preferred
long-run inflation rate is all that matters, we should expect that, in the future, all newly
appointed members of the Executive Board share the inflation preference of the median
Governor or that they are selected two or more at a time and in such a way that the median is
not affected. For example, even though  small countries like Finland and the Netherlands will
not have permanent seats on the Executive Board, the  inflation preferences of the executive
directors from small countries are likely to deviate in opposite directions from the median
inflation preference among the Governors.22 This calculus has also important implications for
the admission of new member countries to the monetary union (section 6).
Tables 1 and 2 reveal that the French Governor occupies the median position among the
eleven Governors in terms of inflation (1976-93 and 1976-98), voters' sensitivity to inflation
and predicted or simulated preferred inflation regardless of whether equation 1, 6 or 8 is
                                                                                                                                                        
Personnel and Legal Services. While Germans believe in the power of ideas and craftsmanship, the French
approach puts more emphasis on personal relationships (networks) and the strategic use of legal procedures.
21 It is hard to believe that the Governing Council could have operated without an ECB President and Executive
Board. But even if so, the dissatisfied governments (Germany?) could have vetoed all later decisions, e.g., on the
conversion rates, without which monetary union could not have started.
Berthold et al. (1998) even suggest that EMU is still fragile as long as the national currencies continue to
circulate.
22 If the Executive Board gradually shrinks, the median Governor and the government agreeing with her, may
temporarily lose the median position. The vetoing government has to discount this temporary loss.
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used.23 However, after adjustment for real exchange rate change, the Belgian Governor is the
median among the Governors (Table 2, column 11).
Germany's strong bargaining position in 1998 may also explain that, in November 1998,
the ECB Council decided to postpone the redistribution of seigniorage for three years even
though Italy, which occupies the ECB median in this respect, will benefit from the
redistribution of seigniorage wealth (see Table 4 which is calculated from Sinn, Feist 1997).
To conclude the analysis of this section, a reminder seems to be in order. The predicted
level of inflation is merely the mid-point of a confidence interval (which could easily be
computed). Moreover, if inflation preferences in the median country had changed since 1993
or if they changed in the future under the influence of an independent ECB, inflation in the
next 15-20 years could be much lower than predicted. However, the current overture to the
game is probably not a good guide to the future.
How soon will the ECB Council be tested? We turn from the long to the short run.
3. An electoral monetary policy cycle?
In the short run, monetary policy for the euro may be affected by the national electoral
cycles of the participating states. To the extent to which the election dates differ, electoral
monetary-policy cycles are less likely for the European Central Bank than they have been for
the national  central banks.24 However, since the ECB Council pays less attention to public
opinion and more to the demands of governments (section 2), there is an offsetting effect.
Electoral monetary-policy cycles have been observed in many countries, including those
which are generally considered to have independent central banks (e.g., Soh 1986, Table 5).
This is to be expected when central bankers have partisan preferences. They may be
independent but, nevertheless, loyal to the politicians who have appointed them and whose
partisan preferences they share. The "party loyalty hypothesis" has successfully been tested for
both Germany and the United States (Vaubel 1993a, 1997a, b; McGregor 1996). Of course,
the hypothesis predicts a monetary acceleration before elections only if the government
commands a partisan majority in the central bank council.
To apply the party loyalty hypothesis to the European Central Bank, it is necessary to
examine the temporal distribution of the national election dates, the party composition of the
                                                
23 This may not be true for the present Governor of the Banque de France who is considered a monetary
hardliner. However, his appointment in 1993 may have been part of the initial bargaining game.
24 Williamson (1975) was probably the first to point this out.
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incumbent governments and the partisan leanings of the ECB Council members. Usually, the
partisan orientation, if any, of central bankers can be inferred from information  about who
appointed them. Table 5 contains all the relevant information.25 It shows that, with the
exception of the Irish, the Dutch and the Spanish Governor, the German executive director
and possibly the Finnish executive director and the two French members, all ECB Council
members are likely to support the incumbent politicians at home when the date of the next
national election approaches. 26
Table 6 reveals a clustering of election dates in 2002-04: in ten of the eleven
participating states, national elections are due between May 2002 and June 2004. In most of
these states, it is true, early elections may be called27 but, in view of this cluster, they are not
likely to be called before May 2002 - with the possible exception of the French parliamentary
elections which may be advanced by the French President.
Will the ten governments command a majority in the ECB Council? The answer
depends on the outcome of some elections in 1999 and on EMU membership. The following
illustrative analysis is based on the following modest "stationarity" assumptions:
(i) The Socialist government in Portugal will be reelected in October 1999.
(ii) The Conservative (People's) Party will remain in the Austrian government coalition
after December 1999.
(iii) EMU membership will not change very soon28
Table 6 shows the size and composition of the minimum coalitions in the ECB Council
one year ahead of the elections, the weighted average of the regular election dates in their
countries and the weighted standard deviation around this mean. The countries' supporting
votes in the ECB Council serve as weights proxying their bargaining power. As expected, the
ECB coalition which minimises the dispersion of election dates up to 2006 consists of central
bankers whose governments stand for re-election between May 2002 and June 2004: the
Netherlands, Ireland, Germany, Finland, Belgium, Portugal, Austria, Spain and
                                                
25 The governments and central bankers are coded as social democratic or socialist (S), Christian democratic or
conservative (C) or liberal (L). If parties of the same code are in government (g) and in opposition (o), subscripts
are used to distinguish them. In the case of coalition governments or cohabitation, the first letter indicates the
party of the prime minister.
26 In France, the next parliamentary and presidential elections are both due in May 2002. If there is an early
parliamentary election before that date and if the "bourgeois" parties win, the two French members are likely to
favour a monetary acceleration in 2001. If not, their behaviour depends on whether the government or the
President is more likely to be credited with  a boom.
   There may be doubts about the "loyalty" of the Italian central bank governor but they do not affect the results.
27 Early elections have been the rule rather  than the exception in Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain, and
they have been frequent in the Netherlands (Vaubel 1994).
28 The outcome of the analysis presupposes that membership does not change before May 2002.
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Luxembourg.29 The weighted average of the election dates preferred by the coalition is May
2003, i.e., the 53rd month of the monetary union. This is also true if the Spanish government
is re-elected in April 2000 and appoints a supportive Governor in June 2000 so that
Luxembourg is no longer needed for the coalition. Of course, the later election dates may be
advanced towards this date, thereby shifting the average to an earlier date. Alternatively, if
France joins the coalition, Spain and Luxembourg are redundant, and the peak shifts forward
to December 2002. In any case, it is very likely that the ten governments standing for re-
election between May 2002 and June 2004 will command a majority in the ECB Council
between May 2001 and June 2003.
If, for some unforeseen reason, an electoral monetary policy cycle does not materialise,
the incumbent governments are likely to resort to expansionary fiscal policies. The German
government has already threatened to do so. According to the "Pact for Stability and Growth",
the imposition of sanctions requires a qualified majority decision of the Council of Ministers
(excluding the government under consideration). Thus, it may be even easier to assemble a
minority coalition blocking a verdict and sanctions in the Council of Ministers than to form a
majority coalition in the ECB Council.30  However, the incumbent governments are likely to
prefer a monetary stimulus to a fiscal stimulus because the monetary stimulus would not
implicate them directly. In any case, there is a high probability that the participating states will
experience a boom between May 2002 and June 2004.
4. Unemployment
Some authors have suggested that the euro will reduce unemployment. However, there
are several effects which partly offset each other:
(i) During the transition (in 1999-2001), additional manpower is required to adapt
computer software, vending machines, price lists etc.
                                                
29 These incumbent governments will be supported by the central bank governors of Ireland (newly appointed in
May 2001), Germany (newly appointed in September 1999), Finland, Belgium, Portugal, Austria, Luxembourg
and the Executive Board members from the Netherlands and Spain.
Note that the last coalition in Table 5 does not include a Dutch member of the ECB Council because the
present supportive Dutch member has effectively announced his resignation for 2002 (as a condition for being
appointed). As several legal scholars have pointed out, this was in breach of Art. 50 of the ECB Statute which
states that "the President of the Executive Board shall be appointed for eight years".
30 The process of coalition building in the Council of Ministers could be analyzed on similar lines. But it is not
obvious that the composition of these blocking coalitions would mainly depend on the sequence of election dates.
Logrolling would be likely to occur.
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(ii) Banks and other firms will reduce staff in their foreign-exchange departments. Instead
of these services, other products will be demanded by consumers and industry. But
these products are likely to be less labour-intensive than the banking services which
they substitute. To that extent, the demand for labour will decrease.
(iii) As the cost of money changing, exchange-rate information, exchange-rate risk and
exchange-control risk disappear among the participating countries, competition and the
demand for output and labour tend to increase. For most transactions, however, these
costs seem to be very small (probably less than 1 per cent31).
(iv) The European Central Bank does not and cannot have the same reputation as the
Bundesbank. Notably at times of pressure, the expected inflation rate will be higher for
the euro than it would have been for the D-Mark and the currencies traditionally linked
to it. If the ECB tries to establish a reputation, the actual inflation rate will have to be
lower than the expected inflation rate, prices, wages and interest rates will be too high,
and unemployment will be larger than otherwise. At the same time, the high level of
unemployment undermines the credibility of the ECB.
This list is, of course, not exhaustive. Monetary union may also affect employment in
indirect ways, for example, by inducing changes in wage setting behaviour or fiscal policy.32
But there can be no doubt that EMU will affect unemployment in several, largely offsetting
ways and that the net effect cannot be predicted - not even its sign.
It is easier to forecast how monetary union will affect the (relative) distribution of
unemployment among the participating countries. In a monetary union, the relative prices and
wages among the participating countries can no longer be adjusted through nominal exchange
rate changes. Adjustment will be more costly and take more time. Past real exchange rate
trends give some indication of future long run adjustment needs. Table 1 reveals that, since
                                                
31 For bank transfers between EU currencies, the deviation of the buying or selling rate from the mid rate has
been about one quarter of one per cent. The cost of forward cover is in the order of 0.05 per cent.The cost of
exchange-rate information is minute. Restrictions of capital movements have been generally prohibited since
1996 (Art. 72E of the Maastricht Treaty and Art. 56 of the Amsterdam Treaty). In the euro-zone, "measures to
protect the balance of payments" are outlawed as well (Art. 120 Amsterdam Treaty). If such measures were
introduced by non-participating EU members, they could be suspended by the EMU members (i.e., a qualified
majority of the Council).
32 Some authors believe that (inflation-averse) national trade unions will aim at larger real wage increases
because, in the monetary union, the effects on the price level will largely be externalised and be smaller for each
of them. Others emphasize that wage moderation and labour market deregulation are less likely in a monetary
union because the beneficial effects on central bank credibility are now largely externalised. Still another group
believes that real wages in the low-wage countries will catch up with the rest because monetary union facilitates
international wage comparisons.
As for fiscal policy, some authors expect  national governments to reduce their budget deficits, thereby
increasing investment and employment. Others fear that the "Pact for Stability and Growth" will not be effective
and that EMU will lead to more government spending.
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1976, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Austria have experienced the largest real appreciation vis-à-vis
the median, while Finland and Luxembourg  have suffered the largest real depreciation. More
recently, after the opening of Eastern Europe (1990), the Benelux countries have switched
from real depreciation to real appreciation, while Spain, Italy, Finland and Ireland have moved
in the opposite direction. As their production is especially labour- and land-intensive, these
four countries are severely affected by the supply shock from Eastern Europe. This is where
monetary union is likely to have the largest negative, or the smallest positive, effect on
employment. Spain and Italy do already have the highest unemployment rates in the European
Union, and their labour markets are among the least flexible in the euro-zone, as is the
Finnish.33
5. Exchange rate policy
Exchange rate policy for the euro has been a matter of lively debate. German, French
and Japanese ministers of finance have called for exchange rate targets between the euro, the
U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen, while the President and the Vice-President of the European
Central Bank, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board and a U.S. Secretary of the
Treasury (Rubin) have opposed the idea. (Central bankers tend to dislike exchange rate fixing
because it constrains their room of manoeuvre, and, shortly before elections,  incumbent
politicians may need their support.) They have stressed the well-known instability of
adjustable peg systems. But the theory of optimum currency areas is also relevant.
Ultimately, the theoretical criteria for optimum currency areas can be reduced to two:
the openness of the economy and the need for real exchange rate adjustment (Vaubel 1978,
1988). The first indicates the benefits and the second the cost of freezing nominal exchange
rates.
The euro-zone as a whole is much less open than the participating countries. Its external
trade (the average of exports and imports) relative to GDP is only eleven per cent (compared
with 20 per cent for Germany). The corresponding figures for the U.S. and Japan are nine and
eight per cent, respectively (Neumann 1998). As Table 7 shows, each area's trade with the
other two is even much smaller: 2.5 per cent for the euro-zone, 2.6 per cent for the U.S. and
                                                
33 See Grubb, Wells (1993) and Dohse, Krieger-Boden (1998, Tab. 12).
We have assumed that international relative prices and wages have to be adjusted in the same direction. This
is true in the case of demand shocks and most supply shocks. It is not true in the case of shocks to the supply of
capital. But if the real depreciation of Finland, Italy and Spain had been due to an increasing supply of capital,
their unemployment rates should have fallen in the 1990s.
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3.3 per cent for Japan.34 Thus, the benefits of exchange rate targets among the three currencies
would be very limited.35
As for the costs of abandoning the exchange rate instrument, I have suggested that,
ideally, nominal exchange rate adjustment should equal the required real exchange rate
adjustment because this is the only way in which all currency areas could enjoy price level
stability at the same time and because nominal exchange rate  adjustment is the most efficient
way of adjusting relative prices and wages between currency areas (Vaubel 1978). If E is the
nominal exchange rate (say, euros per dollar), PEMU and PUS the price level in the euro-zone
and the United States, respectively, and Q the real exchange rate between the two currency
areas, the following identity must hold:
       PEMU
E ≡ ------ • Q
       PUS
or, in rates of change,
∆e ≡ πEMU - πUS + ∆q
Clearly, if both currency areas are to enjoy price level stability (πEMU = 0, πUS = 0) , ∆e
has to equal ∆q. I suggest, therefore, that the absolute difference between ∆e and ∆q is a
useful criterion for appraising the performance of exchange rate regimes (apart from exchange
rate volatility and the average inflation rate). To what extent has the nominal dollar exchange
rate satisfied this criterion?
Graph 2 depicts the logarithm of the nominal and the real exchange rate between the D-
Mark and the dollar, using consumer prices (IMF). Unfortunately, the observed real exchange
rate changes are not independent of the nominal exchange rate changes. As the prices of goods
and services adjust with a lag, short-run real exchange rate changes are mainly caused by
nominal exchange rate changes. But in the longer run, once prices have adjusted, the real
exchange rate is essentially independent of the nominal exchange rate.36 Thus, the longer-run
real exchange rate trends reflect the real causes of equilibrium real exchange rate change.37
                                                
34 A more precise indicator would include those countries which have irrevocably fixed their exchange rate vis-à-
vis one, or a basket, of these currencies.
35 This could mean that the exchange rate between the dollar and Europe will become more variable (e.g. Cohen
1997, Neumann 1998). However, the contrary conclusion is reached by those who believe that the DM / dollar
exchange rate has been used strategically (Martin 1997) or that the Bundesbank has reacted to shifts of demand
between Germany and other ERM members (Bénassy-Quéré, Mojon 1998).
36 Recent panel studies indicate that such deviations have a "half-life" of two years (e.g., Meier 1997; Bayoumi,
MacDonald 1998).
37 Ideally, we would want to know all equilibrium real exchange rate changes that would have taken place in the
absence of nominal exchange rate changes, regardless of whether they are permanent or transitory. However,
empirical research has not been very successful in explaining real exchange rate  variations (i.e., outperforming
the random walk model), let alone, in separating the effects of nominal und real factors. The main exogenous real
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In Graph 2, we can identify four periods with significant stable real exchange rate trends
(1949-59, 1959-69, 1973-80, 1987-96). Within each period, the exchange rate regime is
constant. Table 8 reports the estimated real and nominal  exchange rate trends and the
differences between the two. As can be seen, the difference between the real and the nominal
trend increased dramatically in the 1970s: the nominal depreciation of the dollar increased
much more than the required real depreciation. However, in 1987-96, the difference between
the real and the nominal exchange rate trend was quite small, indeed slightly smaller than
before 1969 under the Bretton Woods system. Thus, flexible exchange rates can actually do
better than the adjustable peg system as far as international adjustment is concerned. The
Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve System seem to have learned to live with exchange rate
flexibility, or the real shocks of the 1970s have been unusual (or both).
Graph 3 and Table 9 repeat the analysis for the real and nominal exchange rate between
the euro-zone and the U.S. dollar.38 Once more, we observe a strong increase of the difference
between the real and the nominal exchange rate trend in the 1970s but this increase is much
smaller than the increase for the D-Mark. In 1987-96, the difference has dropped to a very low
level - much lower  than under the Bretton Woods system. However, this real exchange rate
trend has been harder to predict - it is not significant at conventional levels (t=1.57).
To sum up, long-term nominal exchange rate changes are increasingly doing what they
are supposed to do. This is not to say that real exchange rate trends have been fully
predictable. However, judging ex post and ignoring exchange rate volatility and the average
inflation rate, flexible exchange rates have recently performed better than any other exchange
rate regime since the war. The evidence does not support the multiplying calls for a return to
fixed exchange rate targets between Europe and America.
6. EMU enlargement
6.1. Enlargement by present EU members
                                                                                                                                                        
factor seems to be the difference in productivity growth (e.g., MacDonald 1998: 28-30) which tends to follow a
time trend. This could be the well-known "Balassa effect". Assuming reversion to trend after monetary shocks,
i.e., long-run neutrality  of money, the following analysis is confined to trend comparisons. It expressly ignores
volatility and variance but it is likely to yield robust results. The decomposition of real exchange rate changes
into a component due to monetary causes (not just money supply shocks!) and a component due to real causes is
reserved for future research.
38 Using consumer price indices, the exchange rate indices for the eleven euro-zone countries have been weighted
by private consumption. Owing to data gaps, the series do not start before 1954. Thus, the first period (1954-59)
is too short to yield a significant real exchange rate trend  (t = 1.85).
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Britain, Sweden, Denmark and Greece are considering EMU membership by 2002.
What are the benefits and costs? The costs of money changing, exchange-rate information,
exchange-rate risk and exchange-control risk, which would be eliminated, depend on the
openness of their economies vis-à-vis the eleven EMU countries. As Table 10, column 2,
shows, trade with the euro-zone (the average of exports and imports) amounts to 8-14 per cent
of GDP for the potential entrants. Except for Greece, the potential entrants are more open than
France. As for the cost of joining, Table 10, column 7, reveals that, in 1976-98, long-run real
exchange rate adjustment vis-à-vis France, the inflation median, has been small for Denmark
and Greece but larger for Sweden (-1.0%) and  much larger for the U.K. (+1.6%). In fact, the
British real exchange rate change is the largest in the European Union.
Graph 4 and Table 11 show the real and nominal exchange rate trends between the U.K.
and the euro-zone in the past. The differential between the nominal and the real exchange rate
trend increased dramatically in the 1970s and dropped considerably thereafter (Table 10). But
it never fell below the Bretton Woods level. The British differential in the 1990s was also
larger than the corresponding differential for the dollar/D-Mark and the simulated dollar / euro
exchange rates (cf. Tables 6 and 7). In other words, exchange rate flexibility for the Pound has
hardly been used to bring about the equilibrium real exchange  rate adjustment vis-à-vis the
EMU-11 countries.
The relatively large discrepancy between nominal and real exchange rate trends under
flexible exchange rates may seem to suggest that, in terms of real exchange-rate adjustment,
the opportunity cost of joining EMU would be relatively small. However, since prices adjust
with a lag of about two years, the real-nominal differential in 1993-97 must have been
significantly affected by the ill-fated  experiment of ERM membership in 1990-92. Without it,
the Pound might have done better.
The cost of British entry is, of course, not confined to the loss of the exchange rate
instrument. Another cost is the weakening of competition among central banks. Competition
among the suppliers of money tends to reduce inflation (Hayek 1976, Vaubel 1990),
especially in open economies (section 2). It is true that British inflation has been above the
ECB median and average most of the time (Tables 1 and 10). But there have also been times
when the Bank of England was a forceful competitor. In 1981-84, for example, British
inflation was below the ECB median and average each year.
If Britain joined EMU, regulatory competition would suffer as well. Financial regulation
of the City of London is known to be liberal - more liberal than regulation on the continent.
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Up to now, the regulation of banks has remained in the hands of the national institutions. But,
in May 1999, the President of the ECB has called for the centralisation of banking regulation
in the hands of the ECB.39 According to Art. 105 (6) of the Treaty, any Council decision to
"confer upon the ECB specific tasks ... relating to the prudential supervision of credit
institutions and other financial institutions" would have to be taken unanimously. But the ECB
Council decides about the level and remuneration of minimum reserves by simple majority
(Art. 19.1 of the ECB Statute). If Britain joined EMU, reserve requirements could easily
become more stringent.
In July 1998, the ECB Council decided to impose a minimum reserve ratio of 1.5 - 2.5
per cent and pay an "adequate" remuneration on these reserves. Thus, the opportunity cost to
the banks should be very small. However, as Table 12 shows, the ECB median of the national
reserve ratios had been 2 per cent without remuneration.40 In this case, therefore, the decision
has not been biased towards Germany but towards Britain. This may be due to the competitive
threat from the City of London. If so, British membership of EMU would probably encourage
the ECB Council to raise the cost of reserve requirements. This would impair the City's
competitiveness vis-à-vis New York, Tokyo, Zurich and other major financial centres outside
EMU.
To join or not to join is evidently not just a question of monetary regime. Monetary
union is apt to pave the way for the centralisation of budgetary policy, taxation, social
regulation and wage bargaining (or for the levelling of differences and the cartelisation of
policies in these fields). Moreover, there is a political dimension. After all, the euro is meant
to be the stepping-stone for European Political Union and, ultimately, a European State.
Quite apart from the costs and benefits to the potential entrants and the Union as a
whole, there are political obstacles to enlargement. As in Germany, many bankers and
industrialists in Britain are attracted by the prospect of eliminating currency-related  risks and
transaction costs while the majority of voters is skeptical. But unlike the German government,
the British government will hold a referendum. The British Prime Minister has declared that
membership in the European Monetary System Mark II is out of the question and not a
                                                
39 Interview with Wirtschaftswoche (27 May 1999). Before him, the International Monetary Fund (1998) as an
international organisation, the EC-financed Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR 1998), and Thomaso
Padoa-Schioppa (Financial Times, 25 February 1999), another member of the ECB Executive Board, have made
the same proposal.
40 At the recommendation of the Commission, the Council of Ministers could have reduced the reserve ratio by
imposing a ceiling in January 1999 (Art. 19.2 and 42 of the ECB Statute) but as Table 11 also shows, the
required qualified majority would have been unattainable. In the future, unanimity and the assent of the European
Parliament would be required (Art. 19.1 and 41).
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precondition for EMU entry  (Financial Times, 02/25/99) whereas the European Commission
(notably the French Commissioner in charge of monetary affairs) and the ECB insist that
Britain has to shadow the euro for at least two years if it wants to join EMU (Financial Times
03/25/98, 09/12-13/98).
There is another political obstacle. Table 9 demonstrates that, except for Denmark, the
potential entrants experienced a higher inflation rate, and are less sensitive to inflation, than
France which, as we have seen (section 2), is the ECB median in these respects. Allowing for
the historical real exchange rate change, France would not even be interested in admitting a
pair including Denmark.41 However, provided that there is an Executive Board, France would
keep its median position in the ECB Council if only one country joined and if this country did
not claim a seat on the Executive Board.42 This may create a problem for the U.K.43
According to the Treaty (Art. 121, 122), the admission of new members to the monetary
union is a matter to be decided by the European Council rather than the European Central
Bank and the decision requires a qualified majority (62 out of 87 votes) rather than a simple
majority. If the four potential entrants combined, they would command 22 votes. If their entry
raised the expected inflation rate of the euro, support would be forthcoming from those euro-
zone members which prefer a higher inflation rate than the ECB median. However, as Table 1
shows, such a coalition (51 votes) would fall short of a qualified majority. To be winning, the
coalition would have to include France and Belgium as well. But France and Belgium may not
be interested. They may insist on a very strict interpretation of the convergence criteria. As we
have seen in 1998, these criteria leave enough room for interpretation to justify almost any
decision that is desired for political reasons.44
                                                
41 Since Denmark experiences a long-run real depreciation vis-à-vis France (-0.8 per cent), the historical Danish
inflation rate of 5.8 per cent implies a French inflation rate of 6.7 per cent which is more than the historical
French inflation rate of 6.3 per cent.
42 This is because in a draw, the Governor of the ECB, a Dutchman, could exercise his casting vote in favour of a
low inflation rate.
43 For instance, if the U.K. joined in 2002 and claimed the first vacant seat on the Executive Board from the
Netherlands (Trichet succeeding Duisenberg, Noyer succeeding Trichet, and a Briton succeeding Noyer), France
would lose the median position to the U.K. This is also true if Denmark, Sweden and Greece, or a combination
thereof, joined as well. If all four countries were admitted, Britain would occupy  the median position even if it
did not receive a seat on the Executive Board or obtained it from Finland in 2003 rather than the Netherlands in
2002.
44 Without "creative accounting" and once-and-for-all measures (which the Treaty excludes), France, Germany
and Italy would have exceeded the 3 per cent limit of the deficit criterion (German Council of Economic
Advisors, Annual Report 1997/98. para. 403f., Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Wochenbericht
25/98, p. 450f.). Moreover, Austria, Germany, Italy and Spain have violated the debt criterion because their debt
/ GDP ratio exceeded 60 per cent in 1997 and had risen since 1991 when the Maastricht Treaty was concluded.
Finally, during the two years prior to the decision about EMU membership, the currencies of Finland, Ireland,
Italy and Portugal had not stayed within the margins that were normal in 1991.
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This is not to say that EMU enlargement is politically impossible. To some extent, the
cost of losing the median position is offset by a reduction of currency-related transaction costs
and risks vis-à-vis these countries. But at least two of them, notably Britain, would probably
have to pay a price.
If, instead of historical inflation or the sensitivity to inflation, the preferred inflation
rates predicted by equation 10 (Table 3, n = 15) were taken as a guide, Spain as the median of
the full ECB Council and Belgium as the fallback median (among the national central bank
governors) could afford to admit all four potential entrants  (Table 9).
6.2. Eastern enlargement of EMU
If Eastern European states are admitted to the European Union, they may sooner or later
wish to join EMU as well. Most of them have already linked their currencies to the euro in
one way or another. What are the costs and benefits? Which Eastern European states are the
most likely candidates?
As before, the benefits are related to the degree of openness vis-à-vis the euro-zone. As
Table 13 shows, trade with the euro-zone (the average of exports and imports) is large relative
to GDP for many of these countries, notably Estonia, Slovenia, Hungary and the Czech
Republic. This is because most of these economies are relatively small. Adding Poland, we
obtain the group of countries which the European Union considers eligible for membership.
Negotiations have started in November 1998 and are to be completed by 2002.
But Table 13 demonstrates that the costs of joining EMU will be very large as well.
Except for Hungary and Slovenia, all countries exhibit a very high trend rate of real
appreciation vis-à-vis the euro-zone - some even in the double-digit range (Lithuania,
Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia).
Since the available data are limited to a short period45, the measured trends may still be
affected by temporary problems of transition - notably the need for macroeconomic
stabilisation. It is well known that disinflationary monetary policy and increasing budget
deficits (relative to the other countries) tend to cause a temporary real appreciation of the
currency. In 1993-98, fiscal consolidation in the EMU countries may also have been a
contributing cause. To allow for such transition effects, the logarithm of the EMU-related real
                                                
45 For some of these countries, the IMF International Financial Statistics do not contain the Consumer Price Index
in 1992. Moreover, 1992 was still a year of considerable real exchange rate turbulence for the Baltic states. The
data for 1998 are partly estimates. Bulgaria is not included because of large gaps in the data.
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exchange rates of these countries (qit) has been regressed on µit, a measure of the change of the
money supply (relative to EMU), δit, a measure of the reduction of the budget deficit (relative
to EMU), ti, national time trends, and Ci, a battery of country dummies, in a pooled time-
series  cross-section analysis.46 The following estimate was obtained:
qit =  - 10.98  +  0.024   µit  +  0.41  δit  -  bi ti  +  ci Ci
        (- 99.65*)  (0.77)          (1.32)
R2 = 0.9999,           R2 adj. = 0.9998
As an increase in q indicates a real depreciation (section 3), the estimated regression
coefficients of µ and δ take the expected signs. But they are not significant. The country
dummies are not reported. The national real exchange rate trends are listed in column 3 of
Table 13. Except for Romania, they are very similar to the unadjusted (or unconditional)
trends, i.e., very large.
Table 13, column 4, shows that all Eastern European countries experienced high
inflation rates in 1993-98. However, owing to the real appreciation vis-à-vis the euro-zone,
the inflation rates of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Slovak Republic
are compatible  with an average euro inflation rate of less than eight per cent (Table 2,
columns 8 or 11). These countries could be paired with the others so that the ECB median is
not affected.
EMU membership is efficient only for those Eastern European countries which are very
open, and do not need large real exchange rate changes, vis-à-vis the euro-zone. As Table 14
shows, only Slovenia and Hungary qualify on both counts (category A). But the admission of
these two countries would probably raise the inflation median in the ECB Council. By
contrast, the Ukraine, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Croatia fail on both counts (category D).
They are better served by a policy of independent price level stabilisation, possibly with the
help of a money supply rule. Estonia, the Czech and the Slovak Republic seem to be cases for
a crawling peg system (category C). Romania is somewhere in between (category B).
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where M is the money supply (M1, Estonia: M2), D is the budget deficit and Y is GDP. The data for MEMU  and
DEMU  have been taken from the February 1999 issue of the ECB  Monthly Bulletin, i.e., they are aggregated at
constant exchange rates  (the conversion rates set in 1998). However, the results are almost the same if
consumption-weighted rates of change are used.
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A comparison of the predicted and the actual exchange rate regimes in the last columns
of  Table 13 reveals that only Hungary  has chosen the predicted exchange rate regime.
7. Adjusting central bank staff
In the future, the personnel of the ECB Executive Board is likely to grow both
absolutely and in relation to the central banks of the participating countries. Table 15a shows
the size of central bank staff in the euro-zone.47 To what extent do the total and its
composition have to change?
To answer this question, we shall compare actual staff size with the personnel predicted
by a labour demand function. This function has been estimated for the central banks of 21
industrial countries or currency areas in 1993.48 The following estimate has been obtained:
                                                
47 The data for 1993 (or 1992) are taken from the Morgan Stanley Central Bank Directory which appeared in
1994. The current data have been supplied by the European Central Bank in May 1999. The ECB itself was
projected to have 570 employees by the end of 1998 and about 800 by the end of 1999.
48 The sample includes the following countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium / Luxembourg, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, U.K. and USA.
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ln L = 4.39    +    0.965 ln N    +    0.476 ln  PBN    +    0.602 ln QC
         (4.50*)     (10.84*)                (1.81o)                       (2.41+)
        + 0.665 ln DIS  +  0.362 ln I    -      0.064 ln E   -     0.098 ln Y
        (0.67)                 (0.45)                (-0.24)               (-0.32)
R2 = 0.91
where
L is central bank staff,
N is the number of inhabitants (as the best-fitting proxy for output demand49),
PBN is a dummy which is equal to one if the central bank prints the bank notes itself (and
which is zero otherwise),
QC    indicates the extent to which the central bank actively controls the quality of the
currency in circulation,
DIS measures the extent to which the central bank discounts private bills of exchange and
other commercial paper,
I is the degree of central bank independence,
E is a dummy for exchange rate pegging, and
Y is GNP (or GDP) per capita.
Thus, the demand for central bank staff is explained by the demand for central bank output,
central bank technology and a proxy for the wage level. Labour supply to the central banks is
assumed to be perfectly elastic in the relevant range. Since data on central bank equipment
and land are not available, labour is the only factor of production. The data on PBN, QC and
DIS have partly been supplied by a national central bank (which does not want to be quoted)
and partly been collected with the help of a questionaire. Variables and interactions allowing
for other differences in the tasks of the various central bank (e.g., the responsibility for
banking regulation) did not take plausible signs.50  The log-linear functional form yielded the
best fit.
                                                
49 Other proxies like money supply, number of banks, area etc. have been tried in addition but they take
completely insignificant regression coefficients (see also Vaubel 1997a). In a time-series analysis for Germany, I
successfully used an index of central bank transactions but these data are not available on an international cross-
section basis.
50 See also Vaubel (1997a). However, for a different sample which includes only very few EMU countries, the
budgetary independence of the central bank was shown to have a significant positive effect on staff size.
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In the above estimate, only the output proxies N and QC take fully significant
regression coefficients. This may be due to the omission of other relevant variables, or it may
indicate that the growth of bureaucracy is largely a matter of historical accident.
As a first step, the estimate is used to predict the staff size of the various national
central banks in 1993 and 1998.51 Table 15a reveals that, in 1998 as in 1993, the national
central banks of the eleven EMU countries have been highly overstaffed by international
standards. The most outstanding examples are Banque de France, Banque Nationale de
Belgique and Banca d'Italia. From 1993 to 1998, total central bank staff in the EMU countries
decreased by 8 per cent but, in 1998, the required staff reduction was still 15 per cent. If the
"most efficient" central bank (Banco d'España) is taken as a guide, total staff in the EMU
could even have been cut by 61 per cent.
With the advent of monetary union, the required staff size has to be calculated for the
ESCB as a whole. If the ECB is considered to be as independent as the Bundesbank (i.e., ln
I=1), if the euro is not pegged to a dominant currency (i.e., ln E=0) and if the ECB continues
to refrain from discounting commercial paper (ln DIS=0),52, the labour demand function
predicts an ESCB staff of 47,052 for the beginning of 1999, i.e., a reduction by 6,520 persons
or 12 per cent.
This estimate of required ESCB staff is somewhat larger than the sum of the national
central bank staffs predicted for 1998 (45,018). The reason is that the increase in central bank
independence and the termination of exchange rate pegging have raised the estimated staff
size more than the abolition of discounting and some other minor changes have reduced it. If
the staff component attributed to independence is not needed to defend the ECB's legal
independence (which, as we have seen, is very secure), i.e., if it is simply a waste due to
inadequate accountability, the required ESCB staff is, of course, much smaller. Thus, the
above estimate is an upper limit.
How is the adjustment to be spread over the ECB and the particular national central
banks? The ideal "weight" of the ECB can be determined in different ways.
                                                
51 In predicting staff size for 1998, average income per head in EMU-11 has been held constant at the 1993 level.
Thus, changes in Y merely reflect changes in relative labour costs among the participating countries.
52 The decision not to have a discount facility can also be explained by the median voter theorem. De facto, it has
been taken by the EMI Council. Nine of the sixteen Council members represented countries which did not
operate a discount facility (Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the
United Kingdom; EMI, Annual Report 1994). De lege, the decision had to be, and has been, confirmed  by the
ECB Council where Finland (2), France (2), Ireland (1), Luxembourg (1), Portugal (1) and Spain (2) commanded
a majority of 9 out of 17.
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The first is to take the Federal Reserve System as an example. In the U.S., the share of
the Federal Reserve Board in total central bank staff has been 6 per cent (in 1994, the last year
for which the Federal Reserve System has published these figures53). Table 15b shows that
this implies an ECB staff of 2,823 if the component attributed to independence is not
considered to be wasteful. The remaining staff is allocated to the national central banks using
their predicted values as shares. The predicted values are computed by setting the logarithms
of DIS, I and E equal to zero.
Another possible model is the Bundesbank. In Germany, the staff of the Direktorium
accounts for 16 per cent of total Bundesbank staff. On the same assumptions, the German
model would imply  an ECB staff of 6,958.
If the staff component attributed to independence is regarded as pure waste, the U.S.
model implies an ECB staff of 1,966 and the Bundesbank model a staff of 5,242. Depending
on the assumed share of waste in the staff component attributed to independence, the
appropriate ECB staff can easily be calculated.
Since the Governors of the national central banks have a majority in the Governing
Council of the European Central Bank, the ESCB is more likely to adopt the U.S. Federal
Reserve System as a model. The necessary reduction of the national central bank staff could
be facilitated by requiring the ECB to draw on the national central banks for a considerable
fraction of its hirings.
8. Conclusion
The analysis of this article - like most empirical research - is merely suggestive. The
point estimates make forget that the future of the euro is highly uncertain. But they illustrate
the mechanisms that will be at work.
There are other aspects of EMU central banking which might be explained or predicted
by public-choice reasoning. Some explanations are straightforward. For example, it is not in
the bureaucratic interest of a central bank council to publish its minutes shortly after the event.
Nor was it to be expected that a majority of the ECB Governing Council would give priority
to money supply targets. After all, only one of the eleven national central banks (the
                                                                                                                                                        
   In predicting ESCB staff, ln PBN and ln QC are weighted averages of the national data. The weights are given
by the predicted staffs of the national central banks, setting the logarithms of DIS, I and E equal to zero. Once
more, average income per head in EMU-11 has been held constant at the 1993 level.
53 According to Duizenberg, the Federal Reserve Board Currently employs 1,700 persons of which 200 are in
charge of banking supervision (interview with Wirtschaftswoche, 27 May 1999).
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Bundesbank) had done so in the recent past. Experience so far suggests that the Governing
Council is prepared to lower interest rates even when monetary expansion exceeds the
reference rate and the euro is weak in the exchange markets. Is fine-tuning back on the
agenda?
It is easy to agree on an inflation target and leave open how it might be attained. If it is
not attained, this might be attributed to factors other than monetary policy. After all, failure to
attain the target will not be sanctioned.
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Table 1
The inflation median in the Governing Council of the European Central Bank
Consumer price index
country ECB
votes
                           1976-93                       1976-98 1990-98 votes in the
European
Council
actual
inflation
per annum
annual real
exchange
rate
appreciation
vis-à-vis
median
median
inflation
adjusted for
real
exchange
rate change
actual
inflation
per annum
annual real
exchange
rate
appreciation
vis-à-vis
France
French
inflation
adjusted for
real
exchange
rate change
annual real
exchange
rate
appreciation
vis-à-vis
France
Portugal 1 16.9 +0.4 7.1 13.7 +0.3 5.8 +1.5   5
Spain 2 10.8 +1.0 7.8   9.0 +0.6 6.1 - 1.6   8
Italy 2 10.4 +0.7 7.4   8.8 +0.7 6.2 - 1.5 10
Ireland 1   8.0 +1.0 7.8   6.6 +1.0 6.5 - 0.5   3
Finland 2   6.8 - 1.2 5.5   5.4 - 0.6 4.8 - 3.3   3
France 2   6.7   0 6.7   5.4   0 5.4   0 10
Belgium 1   4.5 - 0.4 6.3   3.9 - 0.3 5.1 +0.2   5
Luxembourg 1   4.4 - 0.5 6.2   3.7 - 0.5 4.9 +0.3   2
Austria 1   3.8 +0.9 7.7   3.4 +0.6 6.1 +0.5   4
Netherlands 2   3.2 - 0.2 6.5   3.0 - 0.2 5.2 +0.5   5
Germany 2   3.2 +0.2 6.9   2.9 +0.1 5.6 +0.7 10
weighted
average
  7.0 6.9   5.8 5.6
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Table 2
Sensitivity to inflation, central bank independence, DM pegging and inflation in EMU-11, 1976-93
country
(ECB members)
sensitivity
to inflation
(Hayo 1998)
(S)
      (1)
inflation
aversion
(Lippy,
Swank
1999)
(β)
      (2)
predicted
inflation
(equ.1,
Table 3)
      (3)
central bank
indepen-
dence
(I)
        (4)
predicted
central bank
independence
        (5)
pegging
to DM
(f)
      (6)
preferred
inflation
predicted
from
equ. 6,
Table 3
       (7)
preferred
inflation
predicted
from
equ. 8,
Table 3
       (8)
median
preferred
inflation
adjusted for
real
exchange
rate change
(equ. 8)
       (9)
Spanish
preferred
inflation
adjusted
for real
exchange rate
change
(equ. 8)
       (10)
Belgian
preferred
inflation
adjusted
for real
exchange
rate change
(equ. 8)
      (11)
Portugal (1)   0.33a 0.68 18.8         0.63         0.59 0 14.9 23.0 8.2   9.3 8.6
Spain (2)   1.35a 0.51   7.6         0.84         1.14 0.14   7.1 10.0 8.9 10.0 9.3
Italy (2)   1.28* 0.39   7.9         1.08         1.12 0.71   7.3 10.3 8.5   9.7 9.0
Ireland (1)   0.92* 0.11   9.7 UK: 1.93 UK: 1.31 0.71   8.7 12.5 8.9 10.0 9.3
Finland (2)  (1.60e) 0.20   -         1.60         1.24 0   6.5   9.0 6.5   7.6 6.9
France (2)   2.05* 0.79   5.80         1.22         1.39 0.80   5.69   7.78 7.78   8.9 8.2
Belgium (1)   2.06* 1.56   5.78         1.25         1.40 1.00   5.67   7.76 7.3   8.5 7.76
Luxembourg (1)   2.84* 1.56   4.7         1.25         1.63 1.00   4.8   6.4 7.2   8.4 7.7
Austria (1)  (3.95e) 4.55   -         1.98         1.90 0.68   4.0   5.3 8.8   9.9 9.2
Netherlands (2)   3.59* 1.23   4.0         1.69         1.82 1.00   4.2   5.6 7.6   8.7 8.0
Germany (2)   5.81* 3.51   3.0         2.72         2.28 0   3.3   4.2 8.0   9.1 8.4
weighted
average   2.44 1.28   6.83          1.49         1.46 0.51   6.25   8.2
a - 1985 - 93
e - estimated from equation 1, Table 3
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Table 3
A cross-section analysis of inflation in the eleven EMU countries, ln, 1976-93
equation intercept sensitivity
to inflation
ln S
central bank
independence
ln I
independence
without pegging
ln I(1-f)
pegging
ln ef = f
imports / GDP
ln m
R2
R2 adj.
n
1     2.221
 (22.95*)
 -0.645
(-6.37*)
 0.85
 0.83
  9
2     2.139
 (15.92*)
 -1.150
(-3.94*)
 0.69
 0.64
  9
3     2.158
 (17.59*)
 -1.120
(-4.44*)
 0.69
 0.65
11
4     2.230
 (27.18*)
 -0.522
(-3.66*)
 -0.297
(-1.07)
 0.88
 0.85
11
5     2.225
 (25.14*)
 -0.664
(-5.54*)
+0.063
 (0.25)
 0.87
 0.83
11
6     2.337
 (19.76*)
 -0.527
(-3.45+)
 -0.220
(-0.69)
 -0.300
(-1.35)
 0.90
 0.85
11
7     2.387
 (18.16*)
 -0.606
(-3.54+)
 -0.019
(-0.05)
 -0.214
(-0.81)
 0.81
 0.76
15
8      3.422
  (9.88*)
 -0.593
(-5.80*)
 -0.136
(-0.64)
 -0.009
(-0.05)
 -0.337
(-3.21+)
 0.96
 0.94
11
9     3.427
   (8.21*)
 -0.591
(-4.45*)
 -0.123
(-0.46)
 -0.026
(-0.13)
 -0.334
(-2.64o)
 0.96
 0.92
  9
10     3.680
   (6.89*)
 -0.698
(-4.77*)
 +0.095
  (0.33)
+0.105
 (0.41)
 -0.399
(-2.47+)
 0.88
 0.83
15
* - significant at 1 per cent level
+ - significant at 5 per cent level
o - significant at 10 per cent level
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Table 4
Seigniorage gains and losses in EMU-11
ECB
votes
Seigniorage
wealth
(billion euros)a
share in
seigniorage wealth
(per cent)
share in
ECB capital
(per cent)a
total gains
(billion euros)
population
(millions)a
gains
per capita
(euros)
Luxembourg     1     0.1       0.03      0.19 +   0.49     0.4 +  1,225
Finland     2     2.2       0.71      1.71 +   3.08     5.1 +     604
France     2   39.8     12.92    21.28 + 25.75   57.9 +     445
Portugal     1     4.3       1.40      2.41 +   3.11     9.9 +     314
Ireland     1     2.6       0.84      1.08 +   0.74     3.6 +     206
Italy     2   50.6     16.43     18.75 +   7.15   57.2 +     125
Belgium     1   10.8       3.51       3.67 +   0.49   10.1 +       49
Netherlands     2   17.6       5.71       5.51 + - 0.62   15.4 -        40
Austria     1   10.5       3.41       3.04 -    1.14     8.0 -      143
Spain     2   46.2     15.00      11.02 -  12.26   39.1 -      314
Germany     2 123.3     40.03      31.35 -  26.73   81.4 -      328
total   17 308.0 ≈100.00 ≈ 100.00 ≈   0 288.1           -
a - Source: Sinn, Feist (1997), Table 3 (column 8), Table 1 (columns 3 and 5)
37
Table 5
Governments and the central bank council in the European Monetary Union
A B D F FI I IR L NL P SP
Government
partisan code S+C L+S+ S+ S(+C) S+Cg +L+ S+Cg C C+L S+L S C
electoral term   4   4   4 5 (7)   4   5 5   5   4 4 4
next regular
election
99:12 03:06 02:09 02:05 03:03 01:05 02:06 04:06 02:05 99:10 00:04
Central bank
governors
partisan code C S S C Cg Cg ? C C S S
age (in 1999) 60 53 57 57 53 63 62 49 56 44 65
date of last
appointment
98:09 99:03 99:09 93:09 98:06 93:06 94:05 98:06 97:07 94:06 94:06
term of office     5     5     8     6     7 ∞     7     6     7     5 1x6
appointed by
incumbents
yes yes yes (yes) yes yes yes yes yes yes no
supporting
incumbents
yes yes yes ? yes yes 01:05:
yes (C)
yes no yes no
Members of ECB Executive Board (appointed in June 1998)
partisan code - - C C Cg? Cg - - S - C
age (in 1999) 63 48 60 59 64 54
term of office - -   8   4   5   7 - -   8 -   6
proposed by
incumbents
- - no yes yes yes - - yes - yes
supporting
incumbents
- - no ? ? yes - - yes - yes
Sources: EMI (1997), ECB homepage and newspaper reports. Information as of July 1999.
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Table 6
Prospective election dates, ECB coalitions and political business cycles
in the European Monetary Union 2000-2006
election
date
country month coalition in the ECB Council (one year ahead of election) votes preferred
election
date
(month)
standard
deviation
(months)
2000:03 SP 15 SP(1)+I(2)+NL(1)+D(1)+FI(1)+B(1)+P(1)+A(1)   9 42 15.6
2001:04 I 28 I(2)+NL(1)+D(1)+FI(1)+B(1)+P(1)+A(1)+SP(1)   9 48 13.1
2002:05 F 41 NL(1)+IR(1)+D(1)+FI(1)+B(1)+P(1)+A(1)+SP(1)+L(1)   9 53   9.2
2002:05 NL 41 NL(1)+IR(1)+D(1)+FI(1)+B(1)+P(1)+A(1)+SP(1)+L(1)   9 53   9.2
2002:06 IR 42 IR(1)+D(1)+FI(1)+B(1)+P(1)+A(1)+SP(1)+L(1)+I(2) 10 62 15.8
2002:09 D 45 D(1)+FI(1)+B(1)+P(1)+A(1)+SP(1)+L(1)+I(2)   9 64 15.2
2003:03 FI 51 FI(1)+B(1)+P(1)+A(1)+SP(1)+L(1)+I(2)+D(1)   9 69 16.4
2003:06 B 54
2003:10 P 58
2003:12 A 60
2004:03 SP 63
2004:06 L 66
2006:04 I 88
2006:05 NL 89
2006:09 D 94
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Table 7
Bilateral trade in per cent of GDP, 1997a
EMU-11 United States Japan
EMU-11 - 1.39 0.98
United States 1.83 - 2.32
Japan 0.67 1.21 -
Total 2.50 2.60 3.30
a  -  The column head indicates the currency area for which the ratio is calculated. Bilateral
trade is defined as the average of exports and imports.
Sources: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1998.
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Table 8
Real and nominal exchange rate trends
DMark/US dollar, annual percentage rates of change
  real      nominal difference
exchange rate
1949-59 +0.43*   0 +0.43
1959-69 - 0.96* - 0.49* - 0.47
1973-80 - 2.19* - 9.63* +7.44
1987-96 - 1.87* - 2.27* +0.40
1987-98 - 0.39 - 0.81 +0.42
* - significant at the one per cent level
Table 9
Real and nominal exchange rate trends
EMU-11/US dollar, annual percentage rates of change
  real      nominal         difference
exchange rate
1954-59 +1.04 +2.72* - 1.68
1959-69 - 1.38* +0.35* - 1.73
1973-80 - 2.63* +0.26 - 2.89
1987-96 - 0.87 - 0.59 - 0.28
1987-98 +0.24 +0.50 - 0.26
* - significant at the one per cent level
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Table 10
Enlargement of EMU by present EU members
1997                   1976 - 93                1976 - 98                           1976 - 93
country prospec-
tive ECB
votes
    (1)
openness
vis-à-vis
EMU-11
[(exports +
imports)/
2 GDP]
    (2)
actual
inflation
per annum
    (3)
annual
real ex-
change
rate appre-
ciation vis-
à-vis
France
    (4)
French
inflation
adjusted
for real
exchange
rate appre-
ciation
    (5)
actual
inflation
per annum
    (6)
annual
real ex-
change
rate appre-
ciation
vis-à-vis
France
    (7)
French
inflation
adjusted
for real
exchange
rate appre-
ciation
    (8)
Sensiti-
vity to
inflation
(Hayo
1998)
    (9)
preferred
inflation
predicted
from
Table 3,
equation
7
(n=15)
    (10)
preferred
inflation
predicted
from
Table 3,
equation
10
(n=15)
    (11)
Belgian
preferred
inflation
adjusted
for real
exchange
rate
change
(equ. 10)
   (12)
Spanish
preferred
inflation
adjusted
for real
exchange
rate
change
(equ. 10)
    (13)
Greece 1   8.5 18.1 +0.4 7.1 15.6 +0.6 6.0 (0.90e) 11.4 19.9 12.1 14.3
Sweden 1 13.8   7.9 - 1.2 5.4   6.3 - 1.0 4.3 (1.27e)   9.2 15.6 10.3 12.5
UK 2 10.3   7.70 +0.9 7.66   6.6 +1.6 7.1   1.82   7.4 12.2 12.6 14.9
Spain 2 12.1 10.8 +1.0 7.8   9.0 +0.6 6.1 (1.35e)   8.9 15.0 12.7 15.0
France 2   9.8   6.7   0 6.7   5.4   0 5.4   2.05   6.90 11.19 11.6 13.9
Belgium 1 36.6   4.5 - 0.4 6.3   3.9 - 0.3 5.1   2.06   6.88 11.16 11.16 13.4
Denmark 1 12.9   6.3 +0.9 7.7   5.3 +0.4 5.8   3.40   5.1   7.9 12.6 14.9
e - estimated from equation 1, Table 3
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Table 11
Real and nominal exchange rate trends
EMU-11/Pound Sterling, annual percentage rates of change
real nominal          difference
    exchange rate
1959-71 - 1.18* - 1.20* - 0.02
1973-78 - 0.62 - 4.94* - 4.32
1981-89 - 2.53* - 0.71 - 1.82
1993-96 - 2.32* - 1.73o - 0.59
* - significant at the 1 per cent level
o - significant at the 10 per cent level
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Table 12
National minimum reserve requirements prior to EMU (end of 1994)
Sight liabilities or money market cash reserve
country votes in
ECB Council
minimum
reserve ratio
remuneration opportunity
cost of reserve
requirements
Italy 2 15% yesa   6.3%
Austria 1   9% no   9%
Germany 2   5% no   5%
Spain 2   2% no   2%
Portugal 1   2% no   2%
Finland 2   2% no   2%
France 2   1% no   1%
Ireland 1   3% yesb   0.6%
Netherlands 2 variable yes <1%
Belgium 1 - - -
Luxembourg 1 - - -
Non-participating EU members:
Greece 9% yes ≈4.5%
UK 0.35% no   0.35%
Sweden - - -
Denmark - - -
a - at 5.5%, market rate 9,5%
b - at 80% of market rate
Source: European Monetary Institute, Annual Report 1994
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Table 13
Openness and real exchange rate trends of Eastern European countries vis-à-vis EMU 11
country openness
[(exports +
imports)/
2 GDP]
1997
trends of real exchange rate appreciation
                       (1993-98)
inflation per
annum
(1993-98)
current
exchange rate
regimeb
predicted
exchange rate
regimeb,c
unadjusted adjusted
          (1)            (2)           (3)           (4)
Croatia 18.2   4.90*   4.16   16.5 MF (E) F
Czech R. 24.0   5.41*   5.19*     7.9 F P/E/C, P/B/C
Estonia 33.7 17.86* 19.99*   19.3 CB/E P/E/C, P/B/C
Hungary 27.1   1.10   1.10   16.9 P/B/C/M CB/E, P/E/C, P/B/C
Latvia 13.7 16.75* -   14.7 P/B F
Lithuania 16.6 24.10* 20.87*   22.9 CB/$ F
Poland 13.5   5.64*   5.32*   17.6 P/B/C/M F
Romania 12.7   6.34   1.27   61.8 MF ($) F, P/B/C
Slovak R. 23.1   4.60*   4.62+     6.9 P/B/M P/E/C, P/B/C
Slovenia 30.0   2.17*   1.73     9.8 F CB/E, P/E/C, P/B/C
Ukraine   5.3 19.89*a 17.7*a 115.0 MF ($) F
* - significant at the 1 per cent level
+ - significant at the 5 per cent level
a - 1993-97
b - The letters denote the following exchange rate regimes: CB: currency board linked to ..., P: pegging to ..., E: euro, B: basket of currencies,
     $: US-dollar, C: crawling, M: margins of fluctuation, F: floating with inflation or money  supply target, MF: managed float.
c- Cf. Table 13.
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Table 14
Optimal exchange rate arrangements for the Eastern European states
A taxonomy
                                                   openness
very open
(>20%)
medium
(5-20%)
need for real
exchange rate
medium
(0.5-2.0%)
        A
Slovenia
Hungary
(→ CB/E, P/E/C, P/B/C)
           B
Romania
(→ F, P/B/C)
adjustment
large
(>2.0%)
         C
Estonia
Czech R.
Slovak R.
(→ P/E/C, P/B/C)
          D
Ukraine
Poland
Latvia
Lithuania
Croatia
(→ F)
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Table 15a
Actual and predicted central bank staff prior to EMU
                                       1993/94                               end of 1998
actual predicted percentage
deviation from
actual number
actual predicted predicted
minus
actual
percentage
deviation
from
actual
Austria   1,251    2,013   +   61   1,152   2,057 +   905  +  79
Belgium/L.   3,165    1,934   -    39   3,007   2,051 -    956  -   32
Finland      894a       643a   -    28      740      624 -    116  -   16
France 17,590a  10,162a   -    42 16,171b   9,000 - 7,171  -   44
Germany 17,632  13,912   -    21 15,891 14,059 - 1,832  -   12
Ireland      626a       736a   +   18      638      701 +     63  +  10
Italy   9,542a    6,610a   -    31   8,956b   6,387 - 2,569  -   29
Netherlands   1,611    1,493   +     7   1,597   1,521 -      76  -     5
Portugal   2,293a    1,809a   -    21   1,828   1,863 +      35  +    2
Spain   3,308    6,632   + 100   3,100b   6,755 + 3,655 + 118
total staff 57,912  45,944   -    21 53,080 45,018 - 8,062 -    15
a - end of 1992
b - end of 1997
Sources: Morgan Stanley Central Bank Directory (1994), Vaubel (1997a), European Central Bank
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Table 15b
Actual and predicted central bank staff in EMU 11
country actual
(1.1.99)
           Federal Reserve model
                      (NECB/NE=6%)
               Bundesbank model
                  (NECB/NE=16%)
predicted
national
predicted predicted
minus
actual
percentage
deviation
from actual
predicted predicted
minus
actual
percentage
deviation
from actual
staff weights
under the
euro regime
Austria   1,152    1,504 +    352 +     31   1,344 +     192 +      17   0.034
Belgium/L.   2,929c    2,079  -    850 -      29   1,858 -   1,071 -       37   0.047
Finland      740       619  -    121 -      16      553 -      187 -       25   0.014
France 16,171b  10,349  - 5,822 -      36   9,249 -   6,922 -       43   0.234
Germany 15,891  12,694  - 3,197 -      20 11,343 -   4,548 -       29   0.287
Ireland      638       708 +      70 +     11      632 -          6 -         1   0.016
Italy   8,956b    6,413  - 2,543 -      28   5,731 -   3,225 -       36   0.145
Netherlands   1,597    1,106  -    491 -      31      988 -      609 -       38   0.025
Portugal   1,828    1,327  -    501 -      27   1,186 -      642 -       35   0.030d
Spain   3,100b    7,430 + 4,330 +   140   6,640 +   3,540 +    114   0.168
total
ECB
53,002
     570
 44,229
   2,823
-  8,773
+ 2,253
-      17
+   395
39,524
  7,528
- 13,478
+  6,958
-       25
+  1221
  1.000
       -
ESCB 53,572  47,052    6,520 -      12 47,052      6,520 -       12        -
c - excluding Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier de Luxembourg which has been separated from the central bank
d - With the transition to the euro, Portuguese banknotes will no longer be printed by the Portuguese central bank.
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Graph 2
Nominal and real DM/Dollar exchange rate (ln)
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Graph 3
Effective exchange rates (ln)
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Graph 4
Effective exchange rates (ln)
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